All Stories

Is the mind really confined within the skull? When notebooks, tools, and the world around us continually participate in memory and thought, might they become part of the mind itself?

Through a corporate office that quietly becomes a poultry farm, this satirical story examines how capitalism turns work into ritual and workers into commodities, alienating people from their bodies, desires, and humanity.

If saving someone costs us very little, are we morally required to act? Peter Singer’s “drowning child” thought experiment asks whether distance should make any difference to what we owe others.

This essay argues that strikebreaking can be morally permissible when it reflects voluntary contract, individual self-preservation, and freedom from coerced solidarity, even though it may weaken collective bargaining and workplace unity.

This essay, by defending “mind-dependent objectivity,” shows how morality can depend on human attitudes while still allowing for better and worse moral judgments. It argues that moral disagreement does not eliminate the possibility of moral objectivity.

This article argues that gene editing for the purpose of curing or preventing serious disease can be morally acceptable, even when future children cannot consent, because parents already make many welfare-shaping decisions before children can exercise autonomy. It defends a cautious, regulated approach that permits therapeutic edits while rejecting cosmetic or preference-based genetic control that risks objectifying children, encouraging eugenics, and undermining their future moral personhood.

This article argues that in-vitro meat is ethically preferable to ordinary meat because it avoids killing animals while preserving many of the cultural and dietary functions of meat. It defends a relation-based approach to food ethics, claiming that ordinary meat-eating may be "suberogatory" or a morally permissible moral mistake, while lab-grown meat offers a realistic path toward reducing animal suffering, environmental harm, and unfair demands on people with limited dietary options.

This article argues that creating AI replicas of the deceased is morally impermissible, even when the person gave prior consent, because it commodifies human identity and reduces moral personhood into a commercial data product. It further contends that digital afterlife systems threaten relational privacy, expose secrets without meaningful agency or context, and risk causing deep psychological and social harm to the living.

This article argues that sexually salacious gossip is morally wrong because it violates privacy, relational trust, and the implicit duties created by intimate relationships. It examines whether truthfulness, sexual content, revenge, and comparisons to celebrity gossip affect the moral status of disclosure, concluding that Jones has a duty not to share Alice’s intimate information without consent.

If it's not murder to refuse to provide an organ that is essential for someone's survival, is abortion murder simply because it refuses to provide the fetus with the abdomen?

Could a grain of sand be a heap?