Ethics in a Changing World

This essay argues that true crime media is morally permissible only with informed consent from victims or their families, which distinguishes legitimate expression from exploitation.

This essay argues that strikebreaking can be morally permissible when it reflects voluntary contract, individual self-preservation, and freedom from coerced solidarity, even though it may weaken collective bargaining and workplace unity.

This article argues that gene editing for the purpose of curing or preventing serious disease can be morally acceptable, even when future children cannot consent, because parents already make many welfare-shaping decisions before children can exercise autonomy. It defends a cautious, regulated approach that permits therapeutic edits while rejecting cosmetic or preference-based genetic control that risks objectifying children, encouraging eugenics, and undermining their future moral personhood.

This article argues that in-vitro meat is ethically preferable to ordinary meat because it avoids killing animals while preserving many of the cultural and dietary functions of meat. It defends a relation-based approach to food ethics, claiming that ordinary meat-eating may be "suberogatory" or a morally permissible moral mistake, while lab-grown meat offers a realistic path toward reducing animal suffering, environmental harm, and unfair demands on people with limited dietary options.

This article argues that creating AI replicas of the deceased is morally impermissible, even when the person gave prior consent, because it commodifies human identity and reduces moral personhood into a commercial data product. It further contends that digital afterlife systems threaten relational privacy, expose secrets without meaningful agency or context, and risk causing deep psychological and social harm to the living.

This article argues that sexually salacious gossip is morally wrong because it violates privacy, relational trust, and the implicit duties created by intimate relationships. It examines whether truthfulness, sexual content, revenge, and comparisons to celebrity gossip affect the moral status of disclosure, concluding that Jones has a duty not to share Alice’s intimate information without consent.